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Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a threat
to healthcare workers. After a brief, unexpected exposure
to a patient with SARS, 69 intensive-care staff at risk for
SARS were interviewed to evaluate risk factors. SARS
developed in seven healthcare workers a median of 5 days
(range 3–8) after last exposure. SARS developed in 6 of 31
persons who entered the patient’s room, including 3 who
were present in the room >4 hours. SARS occurred in three
of five persons present during the endotracheal intubation,
including one who wore gloves, gown, and N-95 mask. The
syndrome also occurred in one person with no apparent
direct exposure to the index patient. In most, but not all
cases, developing SARS was associated with factors typi-
cal of droplet transmission. Providing appropriate quaran-
tine and preventing illness in healthcare providers substan-
tially affects delivery of health care.
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a disease
that consists of fever and respiratory symptoms that
can progress to respiratory failure and death (1). SARS is
most likely to develop in healthcare workers and house-
hold or family contacts of infected persons (2–4).
Unprotected exposure to SARS in hospitals has several
potential consequences, which include the following: ill-
ness in persons and healthcare workers; transmission of
SARS from ill healthcare workers and patients to visitors
and household contacts; and reduced ability of the health-
care system to deliver care because of illness in or quaran-
tine of healthcare workers. In addition, the psychological
impact of isolation and quarantine can be substantial (5).
As a result, understanding factors associated with SARS
transmission after exposure to SARS patients is important
and would assist with formulating appropriate quarantine
procedures. We describe our experience with a large num-
ber of healthcare workers who were exposed to a patient in
an intensive-care unit (ICU) with undiagnosed SARS. 
Index Patient
On March 23, 2003, a 74-year-old immunocompro-
mised man was transferred to our ICU from a hospital
where the original cluster of Toronto’s SARS cases
occurred (2). The patient originally had signs and symp-
toms consistent with a presumptive diagnosis of communi-
ty-acquired pneumonia. Before transfer, SARS was
excluded from the differential diagnosis because the
patient had not traveled, had never left the emergency
department of the referring hospital, and had only had a
single recent outpatient visit to an area of the original hos-
pital in which SARS had not been identified. Upon arrival
in our ICU, the patient was placed in precautions for
methicillin-resistant  Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
pending admission screening results (6). Therapy with
broad-spectrum antimicrobial drugs was initiated.
Humidified high-flow oxygen was administered for the
first 5 h, noninvasive positive pressure ventilation by
oronasal mask for the next 18.25 h, and invasive mechan-
ical ventilation for the subsequent time (7.5 h).
Endotracheal intubation required fiber-optic placement.
That the extent of the outbreak at the referring institution
was larger than originally appreciated became apparent at
this time; therefore, the patient was transferred to another
facility for placement in negative pressure isolation for
possible exposure to SARS. Subsequently, his family
members became ill, and the SARS-associated coronavirus
was identified in the patient’s respiratory secretions (poly-
merase chain reaction testing of bronchoalveolar lavage
confirmed the diagnosis of SARS).
Quarantine
Once the risk for SARS was identified, all patients in
the ICU were considered to have been potentially exposed.
To prevent spread of SARS, we closed the ICU to admis-
sions and discharges and implemented strict respiratory
and contact precautions for all remaining patients. We
quarantined 69 healthcare workers who were considered to
be at high risk for developing SARS. On the basis of our
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Methods
After research ethics board approval and informed con-
sent, two researchers used a structured questionnaire to
interview quarantined healthcare workers. The question-
naire elicited demographic information, details about
health, and information about exposure to the index
patient. Time of exposure was categorized as follows: <1
min, 1–10 min, 11–30 min, 31–60 min, 1–4 h, or >4 h.
Exposure proximity, procedures performed, and infection-
control precautions were documented. Each healthcare
worker was asked about symptoms suggestive of SARS
that developed during or after the quarantine period.
For healthcare workers in whom suspected or probable
SARS developed, additional data were collected about the
nature and course of their illness. Suspected and probable
SARS were defined according to the definitions issued by
the World Health Organization (WHO) (7). Symptoms of
suspected SARS were a fever >38°C, respiratory symp-
toms, and an epidemiologic link with a SARS patient; all
quarantined healthcare workers were considered to have
an epidemiologic link on the basis of contact with the
index patient. Probable SARS was defined as suspected
SARS with radiographic lung infiltrates. 
Statistics
All data were entered into an Access (Microsoft Corp.,
Redman, WA) database by using double data entry tech-
nique and analyzed by using SAS version 8.0 (SAS
Institute, Inc., Cary, NC). For comparisons of characteris-
tics of healthcare workers with SARS to those of health-
care workers without SARS, we used the two-sample t test
for normally distributed variables, Wilcoxon rank sum test
for ordinal and skewed continuous variables, and Fisher
exact test for categorical variables. Two-sided tests were
used for all comparisons. A p value of <0.05 was consid-
ered to be statistically significant. Classification and
regression tree methods were used to identify predictors of
developing SARS (8). The healthcare workers were divid-
ed into two groups by examining all possible cutpoints of
all predictor variables to find the cutpoint of a predictor
variable that resulted in the largest difference in the prob-
abilities of developing SARS between the two resulting
subgroups. This procedure was performed repeatedly for
each resulting subgroup until all members of the subgroup
had the same SARS status or the subgroup was too small
to warrant further splitting.
Results 
Of the 69 quarantined patients, 63 were interviewed.
Five declined, and one could not be contacted. SARS did
not develop in healthcare workers who were not quaran-
tined and patients who had been in the unit at the time of
the exposure.
SARS Development
SARS developed in 7 of the 69 quarantined healthcare
workers (6 probable, 1 suspected; Table 1). One healthcare
worker had a history of type II diabetes mellitus; all other
healthcare workers were previously healthy. The median
time from exposure to the index patient to onset of symp-
toms was 5 days (range 3–8 days). All probable case-
patients were hospitalized and required oxygen but did not
require ICU care. Treatment with levofloxacin (500 mg
once a day for 7 days) and ribavirin (2,000–2,200 mg load-
ing dose followed by 1,200 mg every 6 h for 4 days and
subsequent tapering off) was administered to all admitted
case-patients, and all but one received systemic corticos-
teroids (1 mg/kg prednisone or equivalent once a day for 5
days with subsequent tapering off). The median hospital
stay was 19.5 days (range 13–25 days).  All case-patients
were discharged. However, 28–32 days after discharge, all
reported continued dyspnea with exercise.
Room Visitation
Thirty-one healthcare workers had entered the index
patient’s room; SARS developed in 6 (19%). The contact
characteristics and infection control precautions used by
the healthcare workers who entered the patient’s room are
shown in Table 2. All six healthcare workers in whom
SARS developed and who entered the patient’s room
reported being present >11 min; three were in the room for
>4 hours. SARS attack rates were higher among healthcare
workers who spent more time in the index patient’s room;
in addition, a dose-response effect occurred between dura-
tion of exposure and risk of developing SARS (Table 3).
Contact with Index Patient
All six healthcare workers with SARS who entered the
index patient’s room also touched the patient, and all
reported performing a procedure that involved contact
with the patient’s mucous membranes or respiratory secre-
tions (Table 2). Three of the six healthcare workers report-
ed wearing gloves during this contact. In contrast, of the 13
healthcare workers without SARS, 12 (92%) used gloves
when touching the patient (odds ratio [OR] 0.08, 95% con-
fidence interval [CI] 0.01 to 1.11, p=0.07). Selected con-
tact characteristics predictive of the development of SARS
in healthcare workers who entered the patient’s room
appear in the Figure.
1206 Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 10, October 2003
RESEARCHSARS developed in three of the five persons present
during the endotracheal intubation of the patient. During
this procedure, the patient’s respiratory secretions were
splashed onto the uncovered cheek of one of the healthcare
workers. No other healthcare worker reported direct skin
exposure to the patient’s bodily secretions at any time dur-
ing his admission. Two of the three persons in whom
SARS developed after the endotracheal intubation wore a
gown, surgical mask, and gloves; one healthcare worker
wore a gown, gloves, and N-95 mask. Of the two health-
care workers present during endotracheal intubation in
whom SARS did not develop, one was a postgraduate
medical trainee who assisted with manual ventilation (bag-
valve-mask ventilation using a Laerdal bag) and was posi-
tioned to the side of the patient rather than directly over the
patient’s head. This healthcare worker wore gown, gloves,
and surgical mask during the procedure. The second work-
er was a respiratory therapist who helped prepare the nec-
essary equipment while wearing gown, gloves, and an N-
95 mask.
Of the healthcare workers who entered the index
patient’s room, 22 were present at some time during the
administration of noninvasive positive-pressure ventilation
(NPPV), and SARS developed in 4 (18%). Each of these 4
healthcare workers, but only 1 of the 18 healthcare work-
ers who remained well, reported being present in the room
for >31 minutes during the administration of NPPV (OR
105, 95% CI 3 to 3,035, p <0.001). The one worker in
whom SARS did not develop despite being present during
NPPV therapy for >31 minutes wore a surgical mask,
gown, and gloves. One of the 4 healthcare workers in
whom SARS developed and 4 of the 18 healthcare workers
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Table 1. Description of healthcare workers in whom severe acute respiratory syndrome developed  
Patients  Occupation 
Duration of 
exposure to 
index patient  Precautions
  Special considerations 
Patient 1  Registered nurse  22 h  Gown, gloves, surgical mask
b  • Present during intubation of airway 
• Performed all primary nursing activities on 2 shifts 
Patient 2  ICU resident  31–60 min  N-95 mask, gown, gloves  • Performed difficult intubation of airway 
Patient 3  Registered nurse  None  Not applicable  • Assigned to patient 3 rooms down hall from index patient 
Patient 4  Registered nurse  31–60 min  Gown, gloves, surgical mask  • Assisted primary nurse with bathing of index patient 
Patient 5  Anesthetist  11–30 min  Gown, gloves, surgical mask  • Performed difficult intubation of airway 
Patient 6  Respiratory therapist  4 h  None  • Instituted NPPV 
• Inserted arterial line 
Patient 7
c  Respiratory therapist  6 h  Gown, gloves
b  • Instituted NPPV 
• Frequently manipulated oxygen mask 
aICU, intensive-care unit; NPPV, noninvasive positive-pressure ventilation. 
bDenotes precautions that were taken by the healthcare worker sometimes but not always during exposure. 
cPatient 7 has been classified as a suspected case, as she did not have radiographic lung infiltrates. 
Table 2. Contact characteristics and infection control precautions for 31 healthcare workers who entered index patient’s room
a 
Exposure type 
No. healthcare workers 
with exposure 
No. (%) exposed healthcare 
workers with SARS 
Entry into room  31  6 (19) 
Contact duration for those entering the room     
<10 min  11  0
 
11–30 min  8  1 (12.5) 
31 min to 4 h  8  2 (25) 
>4 h  4  3 (75) 
Nature of contact     
Touched patient  19  6 (32) 
Contact with mucous membranes  10  4 (40) 
Performed procedure involving contact with mucous membranes or respiratory 
secretions  15  6 (40) 
Present during NPPV  22  4 (18) 
Performed or assisted intubation  5  3 (60) 
Infection control precautions used during exposure     
Always wore at least:     
Gloves  15  3 (20) 
Gown and gloves  15  3 (20) 
Any mask (N-95 or surgical mask)  13  3 (23) 
Gown, gloves, and N-95 mask  6  1 (17) 
Gown, gloves, and surgical mask  6  2 (30) 
Gown, gloves, and any mask  12  3 (25) 
No precautions  8  1 (12.5) 
aNPPV, noninvasive positive-pressure ventilation. who remained well wore an N-95 mask during NPPV
administration.
No Room Visitation
SARS developed in one quarantined healthcare worker
(a nurse) who had not entered the index patient’s room; the
disease did not occur in any other healthcare workers who
had not touched or had close contact with the index
patient. The nurse was present in the ICU for 18.75 h (two
shifts) during the patient’s admission. Of note, after the
endotracheal intubation of the index patient, the physician
who performed this procedure entered the room where the
nurse was caring for another patient. Neither the nurse nor
the physician recalled direct contact, and they were certain
that the physician had changed gloves and gown before
room entry. This nurse had no other epidemiologic risk to
explain the development of SARS. 
Other Observations
One healthcare worker spent >4 hours with the index
patient; however, SARS did not develop in this worker.
This worker wore an N-95 mask, gloves, and gown during
exposure and was not present during the endotracheal intu-
bation or during the administration of NPPV. SARS did
develop in another healthcare worker who performed the
endotracheal intubation while wearing an N-95 mask,
gown, and gloves.
Discussion
Our results suggest that proximity and duration of con-
tact to a patient with SARS are associated with risk for
viral transmission, an observation suggested by others
(2–4). In addition, certain procedures, such as endotracheal
intubation, pose increased risk. These findings may be pre-
dictable given that SARS is thought to spread primarily by
large droplets (9).
Three of the six persons in whom SARS developed
after entering the index patient’s room may not have
adhered to standard MRSA precautions in that they per-
formed procedures which involved contact with mucous
membranes without wearing gloves. Furthermore, we were
unable to determine if hand washing impacted SARS
transmission, as this information was not collected.
During our study, we made two important observa-
tions. First, SARS developed in one healthcare worker
despite the fact that the worker wore an N-95 mask, gown,
and gloves. Second, SARS developed in another health-
care worker who had no identified contact with the index
patient or with any other persons known to have SARS. In
the case of the first healthcare worker, the absence of eye
protection may have contributed to disease transmission.
In addition, although this person wore an N-95 mask
while in the patient’s room, he had not been fit-tested for
this mask; however, fit-testing should not be necessary if
the SARS-associated coronavirus is spread by large
droplets (6). As a result of this and similar episodes of
SARS transmission in the Toronto area (10), the province
of Ontario has now made specific recommendations for
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Table 3. Development of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in healthcare workers, depending on time spent in index patient’s 
room (N=31)
a 
Time spent in index 
patient’s room 
No. (%) healthcare 
workers with specified 
exposure with SARS 
No. (%) healthcare workers 
without specified exposure 
with SARS 
Odds of developing 
SARS after specified 
exposure  95% CI for OR  p value 
<10 min  0/11
  6/20 (30)  0.097
b  (0.005 to 1.91)
b  0.07 
>31 min  5/12 (42)  1/19 (5)  12.9  (1.27 to 131)  0.022 
>4 h  3/4 (75)  3/27 (11)  24.0  (1.85 to 311)  0.016 
aCI, confidence interval; OR, odds ratio. 
bThese logit estimators use a correction of 0.5 in every cell of the table that contains a zero. 
Figure. Regression tree describing selected contact characteris-
tics in healthcare workers who entered the index patient’s room.
Does not include results for one healthcare worker who had no
history of entering the index patient’s room but nevertheless
acquired severe acute respiratory syndrome.healthcare workers performing intubation that involve
increased protection (available from: URL: www.sars.
medtau.org) (11), and protective eye wear is currently
mandated for patient encounters. In the second case,
transmission could have occurred in a number of possible
routes. The nurse may have come within sufficient range
of the SARS patient to be exposed to large droplets.
Recent reports indicate that the virus may survive for sev-
eral hours on fomites or in body secretions (12) and raise
the possibility of transmission by indirect contact with
contaminated objects or of inadvertent carriage and
spread by another healthcare worker. Fecal transmission is
unlikely as the patient did not have a bowel movement
during his stay. True airborne spread may also have
occurred. Although evidence does not support this route
of transmission for the SARS-associated coronavirus,
existing literature suggests that other coronaviruses may
be spread by an airborne route in certain circumstances
(13).
Given our lack of knowledge about the transmissibility
of SARS at the time this exposure occurred, we made a
conservative decision to quarantine for 10 days all persons
who were in the unit for at least 4 h or who had a history
of entry into the affected patient’s room. In addition, we
closed the ICU to admissions and discharges for a 10-day
period, markedly affecting our institution’s ability to deliv-
er health care. In fact, during the Toronto outbreak, sever-
al of the city’s ICUs were closed as a result of quarantine
and illness in staff with similar consequences (14); by
infecting healthcare workers, SARS has an impact on the
health of an entire community.  A less aggressive quaran-
tine approach may have been as effective in controlling
transmission and allowed more staff to be available for
work. For instance, only persons who have had direct con-
tact with the patient (i.e., entered the patient’s room) could
have been quarantined. If we had taken this approach, the
quarantine would have excluded six persons with SARS
from the workplace but only removed 25 of the 62 persons
who remained well. However, this approach would have
missed one healthcare worker in whom SARS developed.
Another approach might be to monitor staff closely for
SARS-related symptoms while they continue their usual
activities and quarantine only those in whom symptoms
occur. This approach would require evidence that SARS
cannot be transmitted before symptom onset, confidence in
the facility’s ability to identify symptomatic staff, and reli-
ability of healthcare workers in reporting symptoms. We
think that our quarantine approach prevented secondary
spread of illness to other persons who may have come in
contact with the workers in whom SARS developed.
Our study involved a small number of cases, and defin-
itive conclusions cannot be drawn from a report of this
size. For example, although SARS developed in our staff
within the 10-day quarantine period, others have demon-
strated that the time period from infection to onset of
symptoms may be >10 days (15). One of the strengths of
our study is that the exposure occurred during a defined
period in a contained unit, and as such, there is less poten-
tial for confounding caused by the exposure of healthcare
workers to multiple SARS patients.
Our observations emphasize the consequences of miss-
ing the diagnosis of SARS for even a relatively brief peri-
od. In our experience, we would make the following rec-
ommendations. First, the possibility of unexpected expo-
sure of healthcare workers to patients with SARS should
be anticipated, and once such exposure is recognized,
those deemed to be at risk for SARS transmission should
be promptly quarantined. Second, vigilant surveillance for
symptoms of SARS must be maintained by all healthcare
workers who work in institutions with SARS patients;
SARS may develop in healthcare workers even when they
do not have direct exposure to patients with SARS. In
addition, protocols for managing patients with SARS
should include not only contact and respiratory precau-
tions but also procedures that minimize patient contact
since duration and proximity of contact increase the risk
for transmission of SARS. Finally, additional precautions
should be taken when performing high-risk procedures,
such as endotracheal intubation (11).
Though many of the healthcare workers in our ICU
were exposed to the patient with SARS, our experience
suggests that the greatest risk for SARS transmission
occurs in those healthcare workers with prolonged expo-
sure or direct physical contact with the patient. Use of
gowns, gloves, and masks as barriers appears to reduce the
risk for SARS transmission in most but not all situations.
Additional information will be needed to determine if
modes of transmission beyond droplet spread are impor-
tant. We think this information will be helpful to institu-
tions dealing with similar exposures to patients with SARS
and developing quarantine protocols.
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